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In practical decoy-state quantum key distribution, the raw key length is finite. Thus, deviation
of the estimated single photon yield and single photon error rate from their respective true values
due to finite sample size can seriously lower the provably secure key rate R. Current method to
obtain a lower bound of R follows an indirect path by first bounding the yields and error rates both
conditioned on the type of decoy used. These bounds are then used to deduce the single photon
yield and error rate, which in turn are used to calculate a lower bound of the key rate R. Here
I show how to directly compute a lower bound of R via McDiarmid inequality in statistics. This
method increases the provably secure key rate of realistic quantum channels by at least 30% when
the raw key length is ≈ 105 to 106. More importantly, this is achieved by pure theoretical analysis
without altering the experimental setup or the post-processing method. In a boarder context, this
work introduces powerful concentration inequality techniques in statistics to tackle physics problem
beyond straightforward statistical data analysis.
Quantum key distribution (QKD) enables two trusted
parties Alice and Bob to share a provably secure secret
key by preparing and measuring quantum states that are
transmitted through a noisy channel controlled by an
eavesdropper Eve. One of the major challenges to make
QKD practical is to increase the number of secure bits
generated per second [1]. That is why most QKD exper-
iments to date use photons as the quantum information
carriers; and these photons come from phase randomize
Poissonian distributed sources instead of the much less
efficient single photon sources. In addition, decoy state
method is used to combat Eve’s photon-number-splitting
attack on multiple photon events emitted from the Pois-
sonian sources [2, 3]. From the theoretical point of view,
a more convenient figure of merit is the key rate, namely,
the number of provably secure secret bits per average
number of photon pulses prepared by Alice. This is be-
cause key rate measures the intrinsic performance of a
QKD protocol (in other words, the software issue) with-
out taking the frequency of the pulse (which is a hardware
issue) into account.
Provably secure lower bounds of key rates (I refer them
as simply as key rates from now on) for various QKD
schemes for the realistic situation of finite raw key length
have been reported. For instance, Lim et al. [4] com-
puted the key rates of a certain implementation of the
BB84 QKD scheme [5] using three types of decoy; re-
cently, Chau [6] extended it to the case of using more than
three types of decoys. Hayashi and Nakayama studied
the key rate for the BB84 scheme [7]. And Bra´dler et al.
showed the key rate for a qudit-based QKD scheme using
up to three mutually unbiased preparation and measure-
ment bases [8]. Note that these key rates are found using
the following three-step strategy. First, the yields QB,µn
and error rates EB,µn conditioned on the preparation and
measurement basis B as well as the photon intensity pa-
rameter µn used are determined by comparing the rele-
vant Bob’s measurement outcomes, if any, with Alice’s
preparation states. The second step is to deduce yields
and error rates conditioned on the number of photons
emitted by the source. Recall that for a phase random-
ized Poissonian photon source,
QB,µn =
+∞∑
m=0
µmn YB,m exp(−µn)
m!
(1)
and
QB,µnEB,µn =
+∞∑
m=0
µmn YB,meB,m exp(−µn)
m!
. (2)
Here, µ1 > µ2 > ⋯ > µk ≥ 0 are the photon intensities
used in the decoy method with k ≥ 2. Moreover, YB,m
is the probability of photon detection by Bob given that
the photon pulse sent by Alice contains m photons and
eB,m is the bit error rate for m photon emission events
prepared in the B basis [2, 3, 9]. The key rate R de-
pends on YB,0, YB,1 and eB,1 [2–4, 9]. Nevertheless, the
later quantities cannot be determined precisely because
Eqs. (1) and (2) are under-determined systems of equa-
tions given QB,µn ’s and EB,µn ’s provided that the number
of decoys k is finite. To make things worse, in the finite-
raw-key-length (FRKL) situation, the measured values
of QB,µn ’s and EB,µn ’s deviate from their true values due
to finite sampling. Fortunately, effective lower bounds
of YB,0 and YB,1 as well as upper bound of eB,1 are avail-
able [2–4, 6, 9, 10]. In the FRKL situation, these bounds
can be deduced with the help of Hoeffding inequality [11].
(See, for example, Refs. [4, 6] for details.) The third step
is to deduce R from these bounds [2–4, 8, 9].
Computing lower bound of R using this indirect strat-
egy is not satisfactory in the FRKL situation because
2it is unlikely for each of the finite-size fluctuations in
QB,µn ’s and EB,µn ’s to decrease the value of the provably
secure key rate. In fact, for a given security parameter,
the worst case bounds on YB,0 and YB,1 cannot be not
attained simultaneously if the raw key length is finite.
(This is evident, say, from the bounds of YB,0 and YB,1
given by Inequalities (2) and (3) in Ref. [4] or Inequal-
ities (12a) and (12b) in Ref. [6]. Note that there is a
typo in Inequality (12b) — the Q
⟪k0−i⟫
B,µi
there should be
Q
⟪k0−i+1⟫
B,µi
. In all cases, the finite-size statistical fluctua-
tion that leads to the saturation of lower bound for YB,0
does not cause the saturation of the lower bound for YB,1
and vice versa.)
It is more effective if one could directly investigate the
influence of finite-key-length on the key rate. To do so,
one has to go beyond the use of Hoeffding inequality to
bound the statistical fluctuation, which only works for
equally weighted sum of random variables that are either
statistical independent or drawn from a finite population
without replacement [11]. Here I use the computation of
the key rate of a specific BB84 QKD protocol [5] that
generates the raw key solely from X basis measurement
results as an example to illustrate how to directly tackle
statistical fluctuation in the FRKL situation by means
of McDiarmid inequality [12] in statistics. The technique
used here can be easily adapted to compute the key rates
of other QKD schemes using finite-dimensional qudits in
the FRKL situation.
Recall that the error rate for this particular BB84 QKD
scheme is lower-bounded by [4, 6]
p2
X
{⟨exp(−µ)⟩YX,0 + ⟨µ exp(−µ)⟩YX,1[1 −H2(ep)] −ΛEC
− ⟨QX,µ⟩
ℓraw
[6 log2 χ(k)
ǫsec
+ log2 2
ǫcor
]} , (3)
where pX denotes the probability that Alice (Bob) uses
X as the preparation (measurement) basis, ⟨f(µ)⟩ ≡∑kn=1 pµnf(µn) with pµn being the probability for Al-
ice to use photon intensity parameter µn. Furthermore,
H2(x) ≡ −x log2 x−(1−x) log2(1−x) is the binary entropy
function, ep is the phase error rate of the single photon
events in the raw key, and ΛEC is the actual number of
bits of information that leaks to Eve as Alice and Bob
perform error correction on their raw bits. It is given by
ΛEC = ⟨QX,µH2(EX,µ)⟩ (4)
if they use the most efficient (classical) error correcting
code to do the job. In addition, ℓraw is the raw sifted key
length measured in bits, ǫcor is the upper bound of the
chance that the final secret keys shared between Alice
and Bob are different, Eve’s information on the final key
is at most ǫsec [13–15], and χ(k) is a QKD scheme specific
factor depending on the number of photon intensities k
together with the detailed security analysis used.
For BB84, ep → eZ,1 as ℓraw → +∞. More importantly,
the best known bound on the difference between ep and
eZ,1 due to finite sample size correction using properties of
the hypergeometric distribution reported in given by [6,
16]
ep ≤ eZ,1 + γ¯(ǫsec/χ(k), eZ,1, sZYZ,1⟨µ exp(−µ)⟩/⟨QZ,µ⟩,
sXYX,1⟨µ exp(−µ)⟩/⟨QX,µ⟩) (5)
with probability at least 1 − ǫsec/χ(k), where
γ¯(a, b, c, d) ≡
¿ÁÁÀ(c + d)(1 − b)b
cd
ln [ c + d
2πcd(1 − b)ba2 ],
(6)
and sB is the number of bits that are prepared and
measured in B basis. Clearly, sX = ℓraw and sZ ≈ (1 −
pX)2sX⟨QZ,µ⟩/(p2X⟨QX,µ⟩). (Note that γ¯ becomes complex
if a, c, d are too large. This is because in this case no
ep ≥ eZ,1 exists with failure probability a. I carefully
picked parameters here so that γ¯ is real.)
In the infinite-key-length limit, statistical fluctuations
of QB,µn and EB,µn can be ignored. Then based on the
analysis in Ref. [6] with typos corrected, one has
YB,0 ≥max(0, k∑
n=1
a0nQB,µn)
≡max⎛⎝0,
k∑
n=k0
−QB,µn exp[µn]∏ˆi≠nµi
∏ˆj≠n[µn − µj]
⎞⎠ , (7a)
YB,1 ≥max(0, k∑
n=1
a1nQB,µn)
≡max⎛⎝0,
k∑
n=3−k0
−QB,µn exp[µn]Sˆn
∏ˆj≠n[µn − µj]
⎞⎠ (7b)
and
YZ,1eZ,1 ≤min(YZ,1
2
,
k∑
n=1
a2nQZ,µnEZ,µn)
≡min⎛⎝YZ,12 ,
k∑
n=k0
QZ,µnEZ,µn exp[µn]Sˆn
∏ˆj≠n[µn − µj]
⎞⎠ , (7c)
where k0 = 1(2) if k is even (odd), and ∏ˆj≠n is over
the dummy variable j from k0 to k but skipping n.
In addition, Sˆn = ∑′′ µt1µt2⋯µtk−k0−1 where the double
primed sum is over k0 ≤ t1 < t2 < ⋯ < tk−k0−1 ≤ k with
t1, t2, . . . , tk−k0−1 ≠ n. (In other words, a01 = a21 = 0 if
k is odd and a11 = 0 if k is even.) Substituting Inequal-
ities (5) and (7) into Expression (3) gives the following
lower bound of the key rate
k∑
n=1
bnQX,µn−p2X {ΛEC + ⟨QX,µ⟩ℓraw [6 log2
χ(k)
ǫsec
+ log2 2
ǫcor
]} ,
(8)
3where
bn = p2X {⟨exp(−µ)⟩a0n + ⟨µ exp(−µ)⟩a1n[1 −H2(ep)]}
(9)
provided that YX,0, YX,1 > 0. (The cases of YX,0 or YX,1 = 0
can be dealt with in the same way by changing the defini-
tion of bn accordingly. But these cases are not interesting
for normally they imply R = 0 in realistic channels.)
Note that the worst case key rate corresponds to the
situation that the spin flip and phase shift errors in the
raw key are uncorrelated so that Alice and Bob cannot
use the correlation information to increase the efficiency
of entanglement distillation. Thus, I may separately con-
sider statistical fluctuations in QX,µn ’s, ep in the FRKL
situation. This can be done by using McDiarmid inequal-
ity. Actually, this inequality was first proven using mar-
tingale technique in Ref. [12] for the case of statistically
independent random variables. The version I use here is
the extension to statistically dependent random variables
reported in Ref. [17]. (See also a closely related version
in Ref. [18].)
Theorem 1 (McDiarmid) Let W = (W1, . . . ,Wn) be
a family of possibly statistically dependent random vari-
ables with Wi taking values in the set Wi for all i. Let
f be a bounded real-valued function of W. For a fixed
i = 1,2, . . . , n, let wi ∈Wi and set
rˆ2i (w1, . . . ,wi−1)= sup{∣E[f(W) ∣Wi = wi,Bi]−
E[f(W) ∣Wi = w′i,Bi]∣2∶wi,w′i ∈Wi}, (10)
where E[f] is the expectation value of f , and Bi denotes
the conditions Wk = wk for k = 1, . . . , i − 1. Further set
rˆ2 = sup∑ni=1 rˆ2i , where the supremum is over all w ∈∏Wi. Then
Pr(f(W)−E[f(W)] ≥ δ) ≤ exp(−2δ2/rˆ2) (11a)
and
Pr(f(W) −E[f(W)] ≤ −δ) ≤ exp(−2δ2/rˆ2) (11b)
for any δ > 0.
From the R.H.S. of Inequalities (5) and (7), I obtain
eZ,1 ≤ (∑kn=1 a2nQZ,µnEZ,µn)/(∑kn=1 a1nQZ,µn). A naive
way to study the statistical fluctuation of eZ,1 is to re-
gard QZ,µn ’s and QZ,µnEZ,µn ’s as random variables and
directly apply Theorem 1 to the R.H.S. of the above in-
equality. However, it does not work for the R.H.S. of this
inequality need not be bounded. Instead, I first write
QZ,µn = ∑j W˜nj/s˜Z,µn where s˜Z,µn is the number of pho-
ton pulses that Alice prepares using photon intensity µn
and that Alice prepares and Bob tries to measure (but
may or may not have detection) in Z basis. In addi-
tion, W˜nj denotes the possibly correlated random vari-
able whose value is 1 (0) if the jth photon pulse among
the s˜Z,µn photon pulses is (not) detected by Bob. Clearly,
s˜Z,µn ≈ Tp2Zpµn with T being the total number of photon
pulses sent by Alice and pZ = 1 − pX is the probability for
Alice (Bob) to prepare (measure) in the Z basis. Since
sZ ≈ Tp2Z⟨QZ,µ⟩, I arrive at
YZ,1 ≥ k∑
n=1
a1nQZ,µn = ⟨QZ,µ⟩
sZ
k∑
n=1
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
a1n
pµn
⎛⎝∑j W˜nj
⎞⎠
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
= ⟨QZ,µ⟩
sZ
sZ∑
i=1
WZ,i. (12)
Here WZ,i is the random variable that takes the value
a1n/pµn if the ith photon pulse that are prepared by Alice
and then successfully measured by Bob both in the Z
basis is in fact prepared using photon intensity µn. Recall
that Eve knows the number of photons in each pulse and
may act accordingly. However, she does not know the
photon intensity parameter used in each pulse and the
preparation basis until the pulse is measured by Bob.
Hence, WZ,n’s may be correlated. Actually, the most
general situation is that WZ,n’s are drawn from a larger
population without replacement. That is to say, these
random variables obey the multivariate hypergeometric
distribution.
For multivaritate hypergeometric distribution, rˆ2 in
Eq. (11) of Theorem 1 is very difficult to compute. For-
tunately, it can be upper-bounded as follows. Inspired
by Ref. [18], I define the following.
Definition 1 Let W = (W1, . . . ,Wn) be a sequence of
random variables. Denote pi(Wi) the marginal probabil-
ity distribution of each Wi. The sequence is said to be
centering with respect to a real-valued function f(W)
if rˆ2i (w1, . . . ,wi−1) is upper-bounded by the R.H.S. of
Eq. (10) when all Wi’s are statistically independent and
follow the probability distribution pi(Wi).
It is straightforward to check that multivariate hy-
pergeometrically distributed WZ,i’s form a centering se-
quence with respect to the function ∑sZi=1WZ,i. As a
consequence, Theorem 1 implies that the true value
of ∑kn=1 a1nQZ,µn is less than the observed value by⟨QZ,µ⟩ [ln(1/ǫZ)/2sZ]1/2Width({a1n/pµn}kn=1) with prob-
ability at most ǫZ, where Width(S) of a bounded set S
of real numbers is defined as supS − inf S.
By the same token, YZ,1eZ,1 ≤ ∑kn=1 a2nQZ,µnEZ,µn =⟨QZ,µEZ,µ⟩∑seZi=1W eZ,i/seZ, where W eZ,i is a random variable
taking value of a2n/pµn if the ith photon pulse that is
prepared and successfully measured in the Z basis and
that the measurement result is different from the prepa-
ration (in which there are totally se
Z
≈ Tp2
Z
⟨QZ,µEZ,µ⟩
such pulses) is in fact prepared using photon intensity
µn. Hence, with probability at most ǫ
e
Z
, the true value of
∑kn=1 a2nQZ,µnEZ,µn is greater than the observed value
by ⟨QZ,µEZ,µ⟩ [ln(1/ǫeZ)/2seZ]1/2Width({a2n/pµn}kn=1) =[⟨QZ,µ⟩⟨QZ,µEZ,µ⟩ ln(1/ǫeZ)/2sZ]1/2Width({a2n/pµn}kn=1).
4Since W e
Zi
and WZ,j are positively correlated, with probability at least 1− ǫZ− ǫeZ − ǫγ¯ , the phase error rate ep
is upper-bounded by the R.H.S. of Inequality (5) where
eZ,1 = ∑
k
n=1 a2nQZ,µnEZ,µn + [⟨QZ,µ⟩⟨QZ,µEZ,µ⟩ ln(1/ǫeZ)/2sZ]1/2Width({a2n/pµn}kn=1)
∑kn=1 a1nQZ,µn − ⟨QZ,µ⟩ [ln(1/ǫZ)/2sZ]1/2Width({a1n/pµn}kn=1) . (13)
To study the statistical fluctuation of R, it remains
to consider the fluctuation of QX,µn in the first term
in Expression (8). (Although the second term also
depends on QX,µn ’s implicitly through ΛEC, statistical
fluctuation is absent from this term. This is because
ΛEC is the amount of information leaking to Eve dur-
ing classical post-processing of the measured raw bits.
Thus, it depends on the observed values of QX,µn ’s
and EX,µn ’s instead of their true values.) Using the
same technique as in the estimation of statistical fluc-
tuation in ep, the first term of Expression (8) can be
rewritten as ⟨QX,µ⟩∑sXi=1WX,i where WX,i’s are multi-
variate hypergeometrically distributed random variables
each taken values in the set {bn/pµn}kn=1. Here bn is
given by Eq. (9) with ep equals the R.H.S. of Inequal-
ity (5) where eZ,1 satisfies Eq. (13). Theorem 1 implies
that due to statistical fluctuation, the true value of the
first term in Expression (8) is lower than the observed
value by ⟨QX,µ⟩ [ln(1/ǫX)/(2sX)]1/2Width({bn/pµn}kn=1)
with probability at most ǫX.
Putting everything together and by setting ǫX = ǫZ =
ǫe
Z
= ǫγ¯ = ǫsec/χ(k), I conclude that the secret key rate R
satisfies
R = k∑
n=1
bnQX,µn−⟨QX,µ⟩{ ln[χ(k)/ǫsec]2sX }
1/2
Width({ bn
pµn
}kn=1)−p2X {⟨QX,µH2(EX,µ)⟩ + ⟨QX,µ⟩sX [6 log2
χ(k)
ǫsec
+ log2 2ǫcor ]} ,
(14)
where bn = bn(ep) is given by Eq. (9). Here ep equals
the R.H.S. of Inequality (5) with eZ,1 given by Eq. (13).
Interestingly, χ(k) = 9 = 41 + 4 is independent on the
number of photon intensities k used. (Here the first
number 4 comes from the generalized chain rule for
smooth entropy in Ref. [4], the number 1 comes from
the finite-size correction of the raw key in Eq. (B1) of
Ref. [4], and the last number 4 comes from ǫX, ǫZ, ǫ
e
Z
and
ǫγ¯ through the use of McDiarmid inequality [17] and
hypergeometric distribution bound in Ref. [16].) Al-
though χ does not depend on k for this method, it does
not mean that one could use arbitrarily large number
of photon intensities as decoys without adversely affect-
ing the key rate for a fixed finite sX. The reason is
that Width({a1n/pµn}kn=1}), Width({a2n/pµn}kn=1}) and
Width({bn/pµn}kn=1}) diverge as k → +∞ due to diver-
gence of a1n, a2n and bn [6] as well as the decrease in
min{pµn}kn=1. Recall that computing a1n, a2n and bn is
numerically stable and with minimal lost in precision if
µn − µn+1 ≳ 0.1 for n = 1,2, . . . , k − 1 [6]. This means the
number of photon intensities k used in practice should
be ≲ 10.
To evaluate the performance of this new key rate for-
mula in realistic situation, I consider the quantum chan-
nel with QB,µ ≈ (1 + pap)(2pdc + ηsysµ) and QB,µEB,µ ≈(1+pap)pdc+(emisηch+papηsys/2)µ for 0 ≤ µ ≤ 1, which is
a commonly used channel model for dedicated-optical-
fiber-based QKD experiments. Here I fix after pulse
probability pap = 4 × 10−2, dark count probability pdc =
6 × 10−7, error rate of the optical system emis = 5 × 10−3,
transmittances of the fiber and the system ηch = 1× 10−2
and ηsys = 1 × 10−3. These parameters are obtained
from optical fiber experiment on a 100 km long fiber in
Ref. [19]; and have been used in Refs. [4, 6] to study
the performance of decoy-state QKD in the FRKL sit-
uation. I also follow Refs. [4, 6] by using the following
security parameters: ǫcor = κ = 10−15, where ǫsec = κℓfinal
with ℓfinal ≈ RsX/(p2X⟨QX,µ⟩) is the length of the final key
measured in bits. Note that κ can be interpreted as the
secrecy leakage per final secret bit.
Table I compares the optimized key rates for the state-
of-the-art method reported recently Eq. (3) of Ref. [6]
with Eq. (14) for various sX and k. The optimized rates
are found by fixing the minimum photon intensity to
1×10−6, while maximizing over pX as well as all other pho-
ton intensities µn’s and all the pµn ’s. The table clearly
shows that using McDiarmid inequality improves the op-
timized key rates in all cases. In terms of the percentage
increase in key rate, the smaller the raw key length sX,
the better the improvement. (And the improvement van-
ishes as sX → +∞.) For sX ≈ 105−106, the improvement is
at least 30%. This improvement is of great value in prac-
5k = 3 k = 4 k = 5 k = 6
sX R
′
−5 R−5 R
′
−5 R−5 R
′
−5 R−5 R
′
−5 R−5
105 0.052 0.102 0.027 0.070 0.000 0.027 0.000 0.004
106 0.294 0.388 0.194 0.327 0.100 0.212 0.055 0.129
107 0.687 0.779 0.573 0.756 0.421 0.596 0.259 0.410
108 1.11 1.17 1.04 1.21 0.929 1.11 0.624 0.874
109 1.51 1.53 1.57 1.64 1.46 1.63 1.08 1.33
1010 1.87 1.88 1.97 2.06 1.94 2.12 1.72 1.78
1011 2.20 2.21 2.32 2.37 2.46 2.54 2.18 2.22
TABLE I. Comparison between the state-of-the-art key rate
R′ ≡ R′
−5 × 10
−5 in Ref. [6] with the key rate in Eq. (14)
(or more precisely R−5 ≡ max(0,R × 10
−5)) for the dedicated
quantum channel used in Refs. [4, 6]. These rate are optimized
using the method stated in the main text.
tical QKD because the computational and time costs for
classical post-processing can be quite high when the raw
key length sX is long. More importantly, the McDiarmid
inequality method reported here is effective to increase
the key rate of real or close to real time on demand gen-
eration of the secret key — an application that is possible
in near future with the advancement of laser technology.
In addition to QKD, powerful concentration inequali-
ties in statistics such as McDiarmid inequality could also
be used beyond straightforward statistical data analy-
sis. One possibility is to use it to construct model inde-
pendent test for physics experiments that involve a large
number of parameters but with relatively few data points.
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